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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 August 1951

THE PROBLEM: To estimate the probable effects on Soviet intentions of the publication of US-Japan Security Treaty on August 13, circa September 1, or subsequent to the San Francisco conference.

## I. Effect on Soviet Military Intentions

1. We estimate that regardless of when made, the publication of the US-Japanese Security Treaty would not in itself cause the USSR to go to war to prevent its implementation. The USSR in official notes and in propaganda has long since anticipated such an arrangement. Hence, the mere formalization of this anticipated arrangement will be unlikely to do more than confirm the Kremlin's estimate of US intentions. Furthermore, it is believed that the Kremlin's chief concern regarding Japan is with a scale of rearmament that would threaten the vital interests of the USSR. We believe that the Kremlin would not conclude that the continuation of present arrangements, whereby US forces are stationed in Japan, constituted such a threat.

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## II. Effect on Soviet Political Intentions

2. The publication of the Treaty regardless of date of publication will undoubtedly provoke increased Soviet propaganda charges of US aggressive intent, probably accompanied by thinly-veiled threats of retaliation. These charges will be designed to influence in particular the countries of Asia which suffered as a result of Japanese aggression in World War II. Of the Asian countries, Communist China will be a particular object of such propaganda and will join in it.

3. With regard to the San Francisco Conference, the USSR can

- a. Take no specific action, but continue agitation against the peace treaty. Such a course would probably be based on the belief that it is too late to prevent the conference or acceptance of the draft peace treaty by a majority of the invitees, but that much can still be done in the way of creating discord among the Western powers and of building up resistance among Asiatic countries.
- b. Prior to the conference, offer specific counter-proposals looking toward a general Far Eastern

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settlement. There is considerable evidence that Moscow intends to follow this course.

- c. Appear at the conference with counter-proposals. This course of action is considered improbable.
- d. Attempt to prevent conclusion of the peace treaty through an ultimatum. We believe that the Kremlin would not take such a step unless, from consideration of global strategy, it had decided to precipitate general war.

Of these various courses of action, we believe the first to be most likely, though we recognize a real possibility that the Kremlin may follow the second.

4. Publication of the Security Treaty on August 13 would give the Kremlin added ammunition for its propaganda campaign against the Japanese peace treaty. If the Kremlin should decide to appear at the San Francisco Conference with proposals, early publication of the Security Treaty would provide it additional time to plan its course of action. On the other hand, if the Kremlin should have decided to propose a general Far Eastern settlement, early publication of the Security Treaty might lead

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it to conclude that such proposals would come too late. On balance, therefore, we believe that publication of the Treaty on August 13 would be contrary to the security interests of the US.

5. We believe publication on circa September 1, at a time when the delegates to the conference are out of direct contact with their governments, would permit the Kremlin to create confusion and possibly imperil the signature of the peace treaty by launching violent last minute propaganda attacks and threats against prospective signatories.

6. We conclude, therefore, that of the three proposed dates the latest (e.g., sometime after the Conference) would minimize the USSR's capability to affect adversely the security interests of the US.

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